Philosophers' Imprint: The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference

Author:	Susanna Siegel
Title:	The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference
Publication Info:	Ann Arbor, Michigan: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan University Library Philosophers' Imprint June 2002
Source:	The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference Susanna Siegel Ann Arbor, MI: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan, University Library vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-21, June 2002
Abstract:	Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
Keywords:	Kent Bach Marga Reimer Howard Wettstein Colin McGinn David Kaplan reference reference-fixing demonstratives demonstrative reference intentions intentionality
URL:	http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0002.001
PDF:	Link to full PDF [0.1mb ]

Contents
Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 Page 11 Page 12 Page 13 Page 14 Page 15 Page 16 Page 17 Page 18 Page 19 Page 20 Page 21

Permanent URL for this title: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0002.001

Product of the Scholarly Publishing Office
of the University of Michigan Library
and DLXS
for more information please contact
spo-help@umich.edu