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Author: Benj Hellie
Title: Beyond Phenomenal Naiveté
Publication Info: Ann Arbor, Michigan: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan University Library
Philosophers' Imprint
May 2006
Source: Beyond Phenomenal Naiveté
Benj Hellie
Ann Arbor, MI: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan, University Library
vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1-24, May 2006
Abstract: The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a sort of picture of external entities, as on a representative theory of perception. The attraction of naive realism results from an erroneous projection of the immediacy of the subject's awareness of this picture onto the external entities pictured.
Keywords:
perception
phenomenology
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0006.002
PDF: Link to full PDF [0.5mb ]

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Permanent URL for this title: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0006.002

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