Volume 17 (2017)

    Towards a Neo-Brentanian Theory of Existence

    Mark Textor

    February 2017, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 1-19

    The paper presents an account of the concept of existence that is based on Brentano’s work. In contrast to Frege and Russell, Brentano took ‘exists’ to express a that subsumes objects and explained it with recourse to the non-propositional attitude of acknowledgment (belief-in). I argue that the core of Brentano’s view can be developed to a defensible alternative to the Frege-Russell view of existence.

    Rational Delay

    Abelard Podgorski

    February 2017, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 1-18

    Finite agents such as human beings have reasoning and updating processes that are extended in time; consequently, there is always some lag between the point at which we gain new reasons and the point at which our attitudes have fully responded to those reasons. This phenomenon, which I call rational delay, poses a threat to the most common ways of formulating rational requirements on our attitudes, which do not allow rational beings to exhibit such delay. In this paper, I show first how this problem undermines synchronic formulations of rational norms. Then I show how it likewise undermines the most natural diachronic modifications of these norms. Ultimately, I argue that a successful account of rational delay will reject norms that directly govern attitudes or states of mind like belief and intention altogether, in favor of norms that fundamentally concern temporally extended rational processes like deliberation.

    Civic Trust

    Ryan Preston-Roedder

    February 2017, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 1-22

    It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends. For example, we may not steal someone’s wallet, even if we wish to donate the contents to famine relief, or break a promise to help a col-league move, even if we encounter someone else on the way whose need is somewhat more urgent. In other words, we should observe constraints against mistreating people, even when violating a constraint is the only way to prevent further, similar violations or other, greater evils. But, despite its intuitive appeal, the view that there are constraints has drawn considerable criticism, and at-tempts to provide a rationale for constraints have been, at best, substantially incomplete. In this paper, I develop a novel rationale for constraints that fills important gaps left by views in the literature: put roughly, observing constraints is a condition for being worthy of a certain form of trust, which I call civic trust, and being worthy of such trust is an essential part of living with others in the kind of harmony that characterizes morally permissible interaction. By focusing, in ways that other accounts do not, on the role that observing constraints plays in our psychological lives, this approach not only makes the structure of constraints more intelligible, but also helps us better appreciate the reason-giving force of constraints, and better understand the kind of moral community to which we should aspire.

    How Mathematics Can Make a Difference

    Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan, David Ripley

    January 2017, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1-29

    Standard approaches to counterfactuals in the philosophy of explanation are geared toward causal explanation. We show how to extend the counterfactual theory of explanation to non-causal cases, involving extra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of physical facts (in part) by mathematical facts. Using a structural equation framework, we model impossible perturbations to mathematics and the resulting differences made to physical explananda in two important cases of extra-mathematical explanation. We address some objections to our approach.

    Jonathan Edwards's Monism

    Antonia LoLordo

    February 2017, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 1-13

    The 18th-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards argues that nothing endures through time. I analyze his argument, paying particular attention to a central principle it relies on, namely that “nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing”. I also consider what I supposed to follow from the conclusion that nothing endures. Edwards is sometimes read as the first four-dimensionalist. I argue that this is wrong. Edwards does not conclude that things persist by having different temporal parts; he concludes that nothing persists.

    Conventions of Viewpoint Coherence in Film

    Samuel Cumming, Gabriel Greenberg, Rory Kelly

    January 2017, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 1-29

    This paper examines the interplay of semantics and pragmatics within the domain of film. Films are made up of individual shots strung together in sequences over time. Though each shot is disconnected from the next, combinations of shots still convey coherent stories that take place in continuous space and time. How is this possible? The semantic view of film holds that film coherence is achieved in part through a kind of film language, a set of conventions which govern the relationships between shots. In this paper, we develop and defend a new version of the semantic view. We articulate it for a pair of conventions that govern spatial relations between viewpoints. One such rule is already well-known; sometimes called the "180° Rule," we term it the X-Constraint; to this we add a previously unrecorded rule, the T-Constraint. As we show, both have the effect, in different ways, of limiting the way that viewpoint (or camera position) can shift through space from shot to shot over the course of a film sequence. Such constraints, we contend, are analogous to relations of discourse coherence that are widely recognized in the linguistic domain. If film is to have a language, it is a language made up of rules like these.