http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/ Philosophers' Imprint http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0012.009 Yuval Avnur April 2012 Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that it is not a constraint on such theories that we must somehow have justification to believe that we are not massively deceived. Philosophers' Imprint 12 9